



László Bene:  Constructing Pagan Platonism: Plethon’s Theory of Fate and the Ancient 
Philosophical Tradition 
 
1. The question of Plethon’s Platonism 
 
The Stoic theory of fate and the debates it has given rise to in ancient philosophy have been at 
the focus of interest in recent research.1 We are currently in a better position to assess how 
Medieval and Renaissance treatments of fate and human autonomy relate to ancient strands of 
thought. I set out here to examine Plethon’s theory of fate against the background of the 
ancient philosophical tradition. The particular problems I wish to address are the following. 
What is the relationship between Plethon’s doctrine of fate and the corresponding ancient 
Platonic theories? What are his possible motives for adopting a deterministic position? What 
kind of Platonism does he propound, and how is it related to ancient Platonism? Before 
turning to the details of Plethon’s doctrine of fate, let me first spell out the last question in 
some detail. 
Plethon famously attacked Aristotle and embraced Plato as his primary philosophical 
authority in a work which initiated a long-standing dispute between Platonists and 
Aristotelians in Byzantine and Renaissance philosophy.2 That seems in itself to justify his 
standard classification as a Platonist in scholarly literature. However, given that Platonism is a 
rich tradition comprising several varieties, there is room for the question as to what ‘Platonist’ 
means in his particular case. Various suggestions have been formulated concerning his precise 
philosophical affiliations.3 For instance, Karamanolis argues that Plethon draws on certain 
Middle Platonists as used by Eusebius.4 He points out that Plethon’s fundamentalist Platonic 
ideology according to which Plato’s philosophy contains the complete truth, and, therefore, 
any deviation from it qualifies as error or even apostasy, is reminiscent of Numenius and 
Atticus. In his view, Plethon’s particular objections to Aristotle’s suspicious ‘innovations’ are 
largely based on Atticus’ anti-Aristotelian polemics, and his argument that Plato accords better 
with Christian doctrine than Aristotle is borrowed from Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica in 
which our verbatim fragments from Numenius and Atticus are preserved.5 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive and influential account of Stoic determinism and its Platonic and Peripatetic 
critics up to the 2nd/3rd centuries AD, see Bobzien 1998. There is an expanding literature on Middle 
Platonic and Neoplatonic treatments of fate, providence and human autonomy. Relevant studies 
include Boys-Stones 2007, Eliasson 2009, Linguiti 2009, Frede 2011. Most importantly, Platonic 
treatises on the subjects mentioned have recently been translated into modern languages and 
commented upon. See, for instance, Plotinus 2007, Proclus 2007, Ammonius and Boethius 1998. 
2  The treatise On the Differences of Aristotle from Plato (henceforth: De differentiis, 1439) provoked 
an answer from Georgios Scholarios, later Gennadios II, patriarch of Constantinople, in his work 
Contra Plethonis ignorationem de Aristotele, to which Plethon reacted once again in Contra Scholarii 
pro Aristotele objectiones. The debate continued in Italy between George of Trapezunt, Bessarion and 
others over the following decades. For more on this see Mohler I, 346–398, Monfasani 1976, 201–229, 
Woodhouse 1986, 365 ff., Copenhaver and Schmitt 1992, 87–90 and 140–143 with further literature. 
For Plethon’s De differentiis, see Lagarde’s edition with a commentary (Plethon 1976), and the English 
translation by Woodhouse 1986, 191 ff.  
3 My overview focuses on Plethon’s relationship to ancient Platonism. On the Byzantine context of 
Plethon’s Platonism, see Siniossoglou 2011, Part I, esp. 62–124. Although Byzantine Platonism was an 
important precondition for Plethon’s philosophy, his theory of fate seems to be highly unconventional, 
see section 7 below. 
4  Karamanolis 2002, particularly 264–267. 
5  Plethon’ appeal to the agreement between Plato and Christian dogma seems to me merely 




 Others regard the Neoplatonic Proclus as the main influence on Plethon. This 
connection was first made by Plethon’s bitter enemy, Georgios Scholarios.6 Scholarios’ aim 
was to discredit Plethon in terms of religion as he saw in Proclus the exponent of a pagan 
Platonism revolting against Christianity. A number of modern scholars see this connection as 
largely justified from a philosophical point of view as well.7 Tambrun compares the relevant 
Proclan and Plethonic doctrines in detail,8 pointing out both affinities and significant 
divergences. Her thorough analysis leaves us with the impression that Plethon was a post-
Proclan Platonist who worked out a hierarchical ontology accommodating the gods of pagan 
mythology, but, at the same time, dispensed with numerous distinctive features of Proclus’ 
system. 
 A third view of Plethon’s philosophical affiliations is implied in Siniossoglou’s 
ambitious thesis according to which Plethon’s philosophy is a consequent articulation of ‘the 
essence of Platonism’, which is understood in terms of a definite theoretical and existential 
identity, intrinsically pagan and incompatible with Christianity.9 In more narrowly historical 
terms, Siniossoglou suggests that Plethon relied not only on overtly anti-Christian Platonic 
writers such as Celsus, Porphyry or Julianus but also made use of the techniques of 
dissimulation developed by Neoplatonists living under Christian rule (including Proclus) who 
maintained their pagan Platonic identity but avoided explicit confrontation with Christianity.10 
In his view, Platonism managed to survive throughout the Byzantine period owing to these 
kinds of techniques, providing the soil for Plethon’s radical Platonism. 
 The above overview suggests that Plethon draws on various layers of the Platonic 
tradition. If this is the case, what criteria does he use in selecting his positions and arguments 
from the rich pool of Platonic ideas? To what extent does he feel obliged by the doctrinal 
constraints placed on him by the ancient Platonic tradition or by Plato’s authority? In relation 
to the issue of fate and human freedom, these questions are particularly pressing, given that 
Plethon propounds a deterministic theory which recalls Stoic doctrine in many respects. 
Arabatzis has suggested that certain versions of Stoicism were formative of the doctrinal core 
of Plethon’s philosophy, and has in particular examined the Stoic background of Plethon’s 
doctrine of fate.11 Other scholars have also discerned Stoic influences in Plethon.12 However, 
the question as to what follows from this for Plethon’s Platonism is rarely raised. In this 
connection, Karamanolis refers to the ancient Platonist practice of filling the gaps in the 
Platonic ‘system’ with Stoic or Aristotelian elements.13 It is less than satisfactory to state, 
however, that Plethon follows suit when he lifts the Stoic doctrine of fate since in this case 
there was no gap to be filled. On the contrary, as I shall presently argue, Middle Platonic and 
Neoplatonic philosophers did have an established doctrine of fate which they worked out 
largely in opposition to the Stoics. What is more, they were in a position to support their 
theory with solid evidence from Plato’s dialogues. The fact that Plethon sides with the Stoics 
                                                          
6  Gennadios Scholarios, Letter to Joseph the Exarch, text in Plethon 1858, 424. Cf. Woodhouse 1986, 
73.  
7  Alexandre in Plethon 1858, LIX–LXIV, LXXX f.; Woodhouse 1986, 72–78. Nikolaou 1982, 
however, argues that Plethon’s doctrine of the ‘vehicle of the soul’ is largely independent of Proclus.  
8  Tambrun 2006, 153–168. 
9  For the elements of Siniossoglou’s ‘archetypal Platonism’, that is, epistemological optimism, denial 
of divine ineffability and transcendence, deterministic metaphysics and utopianism, see Siniossoglou 
2011, ix–xii and 403–408. 
10  Siniossoglou 2011, 54–62. 
11  Arabatzis 2005 and 2008, 312–317. 
12  For references, see Arabatzis 2008, 308. 




against the mainstream Platonic tradition reopens the issue of his attitude toward Platonism as 
a whole. 
 With these questions in mind, let us turn to the problem of fate. I shall come back to 
the question of Plethon’s philosophical allegiances in the last section of my paper. 
 
2. The issue of fate in Plethon 
 
The only section of Plethon’s opus magnum, the Book of Laws (henceforth: Laws), which was 
circulated in his lifetime is the treatise On Fate, written prior to 1439.14 The issue of 
determinism surfaces in De Differentiis (1439), and in Plethon’s reply to Scholarios 
(1448/49).15 An exchange of letters between Plethon and his former disciple, Bessarion, then 
Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, contains important clarifications of Plethon’s 
position (and respectful criticisms of Bessarion).16 As far as Plethon’s doctrine is concerned, 
my discussion will be based on these source texts.17 
Fate was among the issues raised by Plethon which continued to be discussed among 
Byzantine scholars both at home and in Italy in the second half of the century. Scholarios 
touches upon Plethon’s determinism only briefly in his Defence of Aristotle (1443/44), but  
intended to refute his doctrine of fate either in a polemical work against the Laws or in a 
separate treatise.18 This plan was not carried out perhaps because this task appeared less 
urgent after Plethon’s death.19 In any case, Scholarios’ student, Matthaios Kamariotes, wrote 
two treatises in which he argues against Plethon’s theory of fate from the standpoint of 
religious orthodoxy.20 Theodore Gazes, a Greek émigré in Italy, wrote an Aristotelian 
refutation of Plethon’s account of fate and human action.21 Laonikos of Chalkokondyles, a 
disciple of Plethon, used the notion of necessity to explain historical events.22 Plethon’s 
treatise On Fate was translated into Latin and dedicated to Nicolaus of Cusa.23 Ficino, who 
                                                          
14  The Laws was only found after Plethon’s death and was burned by Georgios Scholarios due to its paganism. 
The surviving table of contents testifies that the work contained further chapters relevant to fate and related 
issues (esp. I.29–30 II.4–5. III.1). On the destruction of the book, see Woodhouse 1986, 357–363. Plethon’s 
death is usually dated at 26 June 1452. Monfasani (2005) argues for a later date. For the dates of the works 
mentioned in the main text, I rely on Woodhouse 1986. For Plethon’s On Fate I use the text in Alexandre’s 
edition of the Laws (Plethon 1858). 
15 Plethon, De differentiis, ch. VIII in Lagarde’s edition (Plethon 1976), ch. XVIII  in Patrologia 
Graeca 160, ch. 33 in Woodhouse’ numbering, id. 1986, 203 f. Plethon, Contra Scholarii pro 
Aristotele objectiones. Patrologia Graeca 160, 1007A–1008A and 1018A–C, ch. 33 in Woodhouse’ 
numbering, id. 1986, 304–6. 
16 Epistles 18–21, Moehler III, 455–468. Mohler suggests that the letters were written after 1440 (ibid. 
455). Bessarion rejects universal determinism in his work In calumniatorem Platonis where he argues 
that both Plato and Aristotle left room for human autonomy (Mohler II, 180 ff.). 
17  For modern discussions of Plethon’s doctrine of fate, see Masai 1956, 186–199 and 238–244; 
Bargeliotes 1975; Woodhouse 1986, 203f., 262, 234–236, 304–306, 332–334; Siniossoglou 2011, 306–
323; Hladký 2014, 144–150. 
18  Demetracopoulos 2007, 335 ff.  Demetracopoulos argues that the manuscript which he calls 
Florilegium Thomisticum II (Marc. gr. classis XI, 18, coll. 1042, saec. XV), is a copy from Scholarios’ 
notes which he compiled from Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles III as a preparation for the refutation 
of Plethon’s theory of fate. 
19  Scholarios wrote a series of treatises on providence and predestination in which he maintains the 
orthodox Christian position. For a concise overview, see Beck 1937, 151–157. 
20  On Matthaios Kamariotes, see Beck 1937, 108–11 and Demetracopoulos 2007, 326–322. 
21 Text in Mohler III, 239–246.   
22  See Siniossoglou 2011, 322–323, with further references. 




maintained a Platonic view of human autonomy which was compatible with Christian 
doctrine, in all probability studied and critically annotated Plethon’s treatise on fate.24 
The theory of fate is important from a systematical point of view as well. This doctrine 
is intimately bound up with Plethon’s theology, as a number of his arguments for determinism 
appeal to God’s sovereignty, unchangeable nature, providence and unfailing knowledge of 
future events. The theory has an ontological aspect since fate is understood in terms of the 
necessity of all events, and the latter is underpinned by arguments from causality. Plethon’s 
determinism also has a bearing on his account of human nature and on ethics in that self-
determination is explained in terms of the correct relationship between reason and irrational 
desires, and punishment is assigned a corrective-educative role.25 The doctrine of fate seems 
to be a central tenet of Plethon’s philosophy which cannot be ignored if we are to form a 
balanced view of his philosophical allegiances. 
 
3. Fate and human autonomy in ancient Platonism 
 
The problem of fate as such emerged in Hellenistic philosophy. The debate was triggered by 
the Stoics26 who provocatively maintained that “everything happens according to fate” or, in 
other words, “according to antecedent causes”.27 Stoic determinism also has a teleological 
aspect in that fate coincides with divine providence, and brings about the best possible order 
in the universe. The theory of fate implies that our actions are predetermined down to the 
smallest detail before we are born. At the same time, the Stoics were committed to 
compatibilism. In their view, the all-embracing causal nexus does not exclude the fact that 
certain things “depend on us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) since the principal cause of any act of assent (leading 
to action unless prevented by external hindrances) is the human mind which has an individual 
profile, whereas the circumstances merely serve as auxiliary causes.28 
 Platonic philosophers attacked the Stoic theory of fate from the start, arguing against 
the universal scope of fate and casting doubt on compatibilism. In Middle Platonist circles, 
the doctrine of ‘conditional fate’ became the standard view from the first half of the 2nd 
century AD onwards. According to this theory, the first principles from which the events 
derive are exempt from fate, whereas the consequences flowing from them are subject to its 
laws.29 Moreover, in contrast to divine providence which embraces all things, fate does not 
extend to the higher levels of the ontological hierarchy. The Middle Platonists appeal to 
                                                          
24  Keller 1957, 364–366. 
25  Plethon, On Fate 66 (God is not determined by anything), 68 and 70 (foreknowledge, providence 
and unchangeability); 64 (necessity and causality); 72 (reason and desire); 76–78 (punishment). 
26  There were other forms of determinism in Greek philosophy before the Stoics. Aristotle sets out 
and refutes an argument for logical determinism in De interpretatione ch. 9. Diodorus Cronus, a 
Megarian or ‘dialectician’ philosopher of the 4th/3rd century AD, propounded the ‘Master argument’ 
for determinism (Epictetus, Dissertationes 2.19.). The idea of determinism was present in early 
atomism too (Leucippus fr. B2 DK, Democritus A1, 105 f. DK, A 39, A69, A83), later attacked by 
Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus 133 f.; On Nature 34.21 f and 26–30). 
27  Diogenes Laertius 7.149. For further texts, see Bobzien 1998, 56 f.. 
28  For Stoic causal and teleological determinism, see Bobzien 1998, 28–43; for compatibilism, ibid. 
234–329. 
29  For conditional fate, see Pseudo-Plutarch, On Fate; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man 34, 36–37 
and 43; Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism 26; Calcidius, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 142–
190. On the traditional interpretation, the ‘first principles’ are certain human choices from which other 
things follow. Boys-Stones 2007 argues that they are the metaphysical principles of which the cosmos 




contingency in order to make room for human autonomy.30 Human agency decides between 
alternatives which are equally capable of being realized. In this scheme, human actions (or at 
least some of them) are not determined by antecedent causes. The Middle Platonic and the 
Peripatetic understanding of fate have much in common, although the latter seems to go 
further in the direction of a distinctly libertarian understanding of human agency.31 
Neoplatonists adjust the traditional Platonic understanding of fate and autonomy to their more 
refined ontology. An important Neoplatonic innovation is the reconciliation of divine 
foreknowledge with the genuine contingency of human actions.32 Notwithstanding these 
innovations and the subtle differences between individual thinkers, Neoplatonic philosophers 
maintain the fundamental positions of the school. In particular, they limit the scope of fate to 
the physical world, and stress that the incorporeal nature of the soul guarantees rational 
autonomy.33  
These Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic theses seem to have a solid basis in Plato’s 
texts. Plato admittedly did not have a theory of fate, but his treatments of responsibility in the 
context of providence and theodicy prefigure later Platonic doctrines in many respects. In the 
10th book of the Laws, he develops arguments to demonstrate that the cosmos is ruled by 
intelligent and beneficent self-moving soul(s), that is, by god(s),34 and goes on to argue that 
god exercises providence over human affairs.35 The issue of autonomy is raised in this 
context. Plato makes the Athenian stranger, the protagonist of the dialogue, argue that 
individual human souls are, like the cosmic soul, self-movers, that is, the causes of the 
changes they undergo are internal to them. God in his providential capacity does nothing more 
than allocates the self-moving souls to their appropriate places within the universe. Souls as 
self-movers qualify as autonomous agents bearing responsibility for what happens to them.36  
Another particularly relevant Platonic text is the myth of Er in the 10th book of the 
Republic. Let me draw attention to two points in this complex and rich myth of otherworldly 
judgment and transmigration. Firstly, the mythical figures of Necessity and her daughters, the 
three Fates, and the guardian spirit overseeing the fulfillment of the form of life the souls 
choose for themselves37 cannot be understood in terms of an all-embracing causal power, 
precisely because their activity is contingent on the prenatal choice of life the souls make, 
which in turn involves randomness to a minimal extent.38 In fact, Plato combines the elements 
of necessity, chance and rational choice in a subtle way. Secondly, it cannot be reasonably 
doubted that within this combination the most emphatic component is autonomous human 
agency.39 Socrates’ mythical account culminates at the moment when the prophet of Lachesis 
warns the souls that are about to choose their future form of life that “responsibility lies with 
that who chooses; god is not responsible” (617e3 f.). Thus, human autonomy turns out to be 
indispensable for divine goodness and justice. The two aspects of the myth highlighted here 
                                                          
30  Alcinous Didascalicus 26.3; Pseudo-Plutarchus, On Fate 571b–c; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man 
c. 34. 
31  Alexander of Aphrodisias embraces an understanding of human action which implies that human 
agents are capable of acting independently not only of external circumstances but also of their own 
internal dispositions. See Alexander, On Fate 12, 180, 4 f. and 20. f. Bruns. 
32  On divine foreknowledge in late Neoplatonism, see Tempelis 1997,  Ammonius and Boethius 
1998, and section 5 below. 
33  Eliasson 2009; Linguiti 2009. 
34  Plato, Laws 893b–899d. 
35  Plato, Laws 899d–905c. 
36  Plato, Laws 903d3–905c4. 
37  Plato, Republic 616c4, 617b4–d2, 617e1–3. 
38  The order in which the souls choose among the ‘patterns of life’ is decided by lots, ibid. 616e6f. 




justify both the limitation of the scope of fate and the emphasis on the independence from fate 
of the rational soul in later Platonism. 
The ancient Platonic and Stoic ideas just mentioned will provide us with useful 
points of reference for interpreting Plethon’s theory of fate and human freedom. 
 
4. Causal and modal aspects: Plethon’s necessitarianism 
 
Plethon deduces determinism from two causal principles both in his treatise On Fate and in 
De differentiis.40 According to the first principle, everything that comes to be comes to be 
from a cause. This principle is already explicitly formulated by Plato, and is almost 
universally accepted in Greek philosophy.41 The second principle, upon which Plethon’s 
argument turns, maintains that every cause brings about its effect necessarily and in a 
determinate way.  
 
Beyond doubt all things are determined. For if any event were to occur without being 
determined, either it would occur without its cause, and there would therefore be 
something which came into existence uncaused; or the cause which produced it would 
be operating in an indeterminate fashion, subject to no necessity, and there would 
therefore be a cause which did not produce its effects in a necessary and determinate 
fashion (ἀνάγκῃ … ὡρισμένως). Neither of these alternatives is possible.42 
 
The claim that causes produce their effects in a necessary and determinate manner deserves 
closer examination. In her edition of De differentiis, Lagarde connects this principle with the 
Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis 982C, and with Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione II.10, 
336a27-28. The first passage, which Plethon adduces as a Platonic proof-text for his 
determinism in a letter to Bessarion,43 does not seem pertinent, as it treats the agency of the 
intelligent celestial souls (that is, gods) rather than causality in general, and does not invoke 
necessity in a technical sense.44 The Aristotelian passage formulates a general causal 
principle: “for by nature the same [cause], provided it remain in the same state, always 
produces the same [effect]”.45 This statement comes closer to the problem at stake. It can be 
                                                          
40  Plethon, On Fate 64; De differentiis ch. VIII., 46 Lagarde, ch. 33, 203 Woodhouse. See also 
Plethon’s Reply to Scholarios, Patrologia Graeca 160, 1007B–C, ch. 33, 305 Woodhouse; Ep. 19, 
Mohler III, 461, 18–28. 
41  Plato, Timaeus 28A4–6; cf. Parmenides fr. B8, 7 ff. DK; Leucippus fr. B2 DK. The Epicureans 
invoke an atomic ‘swerve’ in order to explain the formation of compound bodies and  account for 
human autonomy. Their critics protest against the ‘uncaused motions’ they postulated. See Cicero, On 
Fate 23; Epicurea fr. 280 Usener. In addition, Plutarch sets out an argument against determinism 
coming from an unnamed philosopher according to which our choice between two equivalent 
alternatives can only be explained in terms of ‘adventitious motions’ arising in our soul; he also 
reports Chrysippus’ reply who insists that different effects must have different causes (On Stoic 
Contradictions  ch. 23, 1045B–D). 
42  Plethon, On Fate, 64, translation by Woodhouse. 
43 Plethon, Ep. 21, Mohler III, 466, ff. 
44  982b5–c5: “The necessity of the soul that possesses intelligence is far the most powerful of all necessities. 
For it is a ruler, not a subject, and so ordains its decrees. When a soul reaches the best decision in accordance 
with the best intelligence, the result, which is truly to its mind, is perfectly unalterable. Not even adamant could 
ever be mightier and more unalterable. Truly, three Fates hold fast whatever has been decided through the best 
counsel by each and all of the gods, and guarantee that it is brought to pass.” Translation by R. D. McKirahan. 
45  τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε ποιεῖν. Translation by H. H. Joachim, modified. The 
principle is invoked in a proof for the plurality of motions on the cosmic level. Aristotle argues that generation 




argued that it has deterministic implications, although this is a possibility which in all 
probability did not occur to Aristotle himself.46 In any case, neither passage provides Plethon 
with the conceptual tools to construct his argument for determinism.  
We find, however, a passage in the Neoplatonic Ammonius (435/445-517/526 AD) 
which contains a formulation which is strikingly close to Plethon’s second causal principle. In 
the introduction to his exegesis of Aristotle’s treatment of futurum contingens in De 
interpretatione ch. 9, Ammonius argues that the problem is relevant, among other branches of 
philosophy, to metaphysics as well: 
 
You will also find that this study extends to first philosophy. For the theologian too will 
investigate how the things in the world are governed by providence, and whether all that 
comes to be arises in a definite manner and of necessity (ὡρισμένως καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης), 
like what holds in the case of eternal things, or there are also some things which occur 
contingently, whose coming to be one must ascribe to causes which are, obviously, 
particular and at each time different.47  
 
Ammonius is setting up a dilemma between the acceptance of universal necessity of all events 
and a view accommodating certain contingent occurrences as well.48 Plethon’s dilemma is the 
same, except for some minor variations in terminology.49 In the argument for the determinist 
option, Plethon goes on to describe the relationship between the cause and the effect in the 
very same terms (ἀνάγκῃ … ὡρισμένως) by which Ammonius characterizes  “becoming” or 
the events taking place in the cosmos (ὡρισμένως καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης) in the first horn of his 
dilemma. In my view, Ammonius’ text must have been among Plethon’s inspirations with 
regard to his second causal principle. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that 
Plethon’s argument in favor of fate primarily revolves around the question of divine 
foreknowledge, the problem Ammonius addresses in a lengthy digression after the passage 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
posited in order to account for them. Another pertinent Aristotelian passage is Physics II.4, 195b36–196a3: 
“Some people wonder even whether there are any such things  [sc. luck and the automatic] or not. They say that 
nothing comes to be as an outcome of luck, but that there is a definite cause of everything (πάντων εἶναί τι αἴτιον 
ὡρισμένον) which we say comes to be as an automatic outcome oras an outcome of luck.” Translation by W. 
Charlton. In spite of the similarity of the wording to Plethon’s second causal principle, the problem Aristotle is 
dealing here with is in fact closer to the object of Plethon’s first causal principle, namely, the question of whether 
there are events without a cause, see the example adduced at 196a3–5. 
46  He contrasts necessary and non-necessary being in De generatione et corruptione II.11.  
47  Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation, 131, 4– 10, translation by David Blank. 
48  The terminology of ‘definiteness’ or ‘determinateness’ (ὡρισμένως) is primarily used by 
Ammonius  in relation to propositions. He repeatedly states that in contradictory pairs of future 
contingent propositions truth and falsity are not distributed definitely (e.g. 131, 2–4; 140, 13); for 
further occurrences and discussion see Sorabji’s Introduction in Ammonius 1998, 8–13. The idea 
ultimately goes back to Aristotle’s claim that in contradictory pairs of future contingent propositions 
“it is necessary for one member … to be true or false –not, however, this one or that one, but however 
it chances”  (On interpretation 19a36–38). Ammonius also frequently employs the term ὡρισμένως in 
connection with divine foreknowledge (e.g. 132, 11–13; 134, 25). There is a passage, however, in 
which the term is used to characterize the way in which a cause produces its effect. If someone goes 
out in order to see a friend but on his way happens to buy a book, the latter event merely supervenes 
on the original intention, and there is “no proximate cause which did this in a definite manner” (142, 
26 f.).  
49  The dilemma is first stated in terms of a contrast between determination and fate (ὥρισταί τε καὶ 
εἵμαρται) on the one hand and chance (ὅπως ἂν τύχοι) on the other, but in the argument fate and 
necessity are treated as equivalent (οἱ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων ἀνάγκην τε καὶ εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦντες, 
Alexandre, 64). The problem is rephrased in terms of necessity and contingency in Ep. 19. Mohler III, 






 The important thing, nevertheless, is that in terms of doctrine Plethon does not 
follow the Neoplatonic Ammonius who is at pains to preserve genuine contingency. On the 
contrary, he embraces the determinist thesis which Ammonius opposes both in his 
independent discussion of divine foreknowledge and in the exegesis of Aristotle’s text. We 
can conclude, I think, that Plethon merely exploited Ammonius’ text as a source for the 
determinist position.51 
 There is sufficient evidence that Plethon relies not only on the determinist position 
which is entertained as a theoretical possibility and firmly rejected by Aristotle and his 
commentators, but also on the robust theory advocated by the Stoics.52 It is part of the Stoics’ 
theory that fate is inescapable and unalterable. At the same time, Alexander of Aphrodisias, a 
Peripatetic philosopher (2
nd
 century CE) whose polemical treatise is among the main sources 
of the Stoic doctrine, reports that the Stoics claimed to preserve contingency:  
 
The possible and the contingent is not done away with, if all things come to be 
according to fate, on these grounds: (i) It is possible for that to come to be which is not 
prevented from coming to be, even if it does not come to be. (ii) The opposites of the 
things that come to be in accordance with fate have not been prevented from coming to 
be (for which reason they are still possible even though they do not come to be).53  
 
Apparently, the Stoics consider the necessity of human actions and personal responsibility as 
incompatible,54 and, for this reason,  insist that certain events which actually take place are not 
necessary in the technical sense of the word.55 Alexander is not impressed by their 
argumentation, however. He protests that the Stoics must admit that events that cannot take 
place otherwise than they in fact do are necessary.56 From the perspective of an external critic 
such as Alexander, the Stoic thesis, according to which fate is all-embracing, inescapable and 
unalterable, boils down to the claim that all events are necessary. Plethon accepts the latter 
interpretation of the determinist theory of fate, but, unlike the ancient writers who describe the 
Stoic doctrine in these terms, he wholeheartedly subscribes to it.  
 This can be seen from his exchange of letters with his former pupil, Bessarion. In a 
restatement of his doctrine of fate, Plethon points out that the two causal principles he appeals 
to entail the abolition of contingency (τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον). He also criticizes the Aristotelians 
who, in his interpretation, locate contingency “inclined to both sides” (ἀμφίρροπον) in the 
                                                          
50  mmonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation, 132, 8–138.11. 
51  Michael Psellus literally quotes the Ammonius passage in a text devoted to the issue of divine 
foreknowledge (Opuscula II, 155), although one does not have to assume that Plethon knows it 
secondhand, as he seems to be well-versed in the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, cf. 
Woodhouse 1986, 68. 
52  Plethon, unlike Aristotle and Ammonius, formulates his doctrine in terms of ‘fate’ (εἱμαρμένη) in 
his treatise on the subject. In a letter in which he sets out to answer the doubts raised by Bessarion 
concerning his theory of fate, he appeals, along with Plato’s authority, to the Stoics, and quotes 
Cleanthes’ celebrated verses on destiny (πεπρωμένη), see Ep. 19, Mohler III, 462, 22–27. 
53 Alexander, On Fate 10, 176, 14 ff. translation by R. W. Sharples. 
54    Cf. Cicero, On Fate 39, 41; Augustinus, On the City of God V.10.  
55  In Chrysippus’ system of modalities there are propositions which are true but not necessary, and 
propositions which are false but possible, that is to say, his theory accommodates contingency (even if 
he does not use a single term for this concept). On modalities in Chrysippus, see Bobzien 1998, 112–
119. 
56  Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate 9, 174, 30–175, 8; 10, 177, 27–178, 7. For this type of criticism 





will.57 At a later stage of their exchange, Plethon distinguishes between necessity interpreted 
in terms of what cannot be otherwise (τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως σχεῖν) on the one hand and 
necessity understood in terms of force (βία) on the other.58 He argues that the workings of 
reason are even more necessary than the violent necessity of desire.59 Which sense of 
‘necessity’ does he have in mind here? The necessity of reason is opposed to the violent kind 
of necessity of desire, but, at the same time, both reason and desire are said to be necessary, 
presumably in the same sense of the word. Plethon’s point must be that our actions are 
necessary in the modal sense, that is, we cannot act otherwise than we actually do. 
Plethon’s rejection of contingency and his necessitarianism stands in sharp contrast 
to the Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition which saw contingency as requisite for 
human autonomy. What is more, he goes beyond the Stoics themselves in maintaining that all 
events are necessary in the technical, modal sense of the word. It is not clear as to whether he 
was inspired by the necessitarianism of radical ancient thinkers such as Diodorus Cronus. I 
would instead assume that he draws on the (more or less hostile) Platonic and Peripatetic 
portrayals of the Stoic position which equated Stoic causal determinism with 
necessitarianism. He once again uses these texts as sources and appropriates the view which 
the Platonists traditionally opposed. He does not seem to be particularly bothered by the anti-
Platonism or by the radical character of the position he is adopting. 
 
5. The argument for determinism from divine foreknowledge 
 
In addition to the demonstration based on the two causal principles I have examined, 
Plethon’s primary argument for determinism seems to be his appeal to divine foreknowledge 
and divination. 
 
Furthermore, if future events have not already been determined, there could be no 
foreknowledge of them not only by men, but also by any of the gods, since it is 
impossible that there be knowledge of what is absolutely indeterminate; for it would not 
be possible to decide which member [of the contradictory pair] is true, and to say either 
that such-and-such will happen or that it will not. As it is, the gods surely do know 
future events, since they also determine them […].60  
 
The important premise of this argument is that knowledge essentially depends on the nature of 
its object, that is to say, only determinate objects can be known. In this framework, the 
existence of divine foreknowledge and divination entails that future statements (presumably 
including future statements concerning particulars) have a definite truth value, and that future 
events are fixed in advance. Simply put, divine foreknowledge seems to be incompatible with 
indeterminism, and this can be adduced in favor of the determinist thesis.  
Alexander of Aphrodisias discusses the issue of divine foreknowledge in connection 
with the Stoic theory of fate (On Fate 30). The Stoics postulated that the knowledge of the 
gods extends to all future events, and they argued that this is only possible if future events are 
predetermined, that is to say, if everything happens according to fate.61 Alexander is at one 
                                                          
57  Plethon, Ep. 19, Mohler III, 461, 21 ff.  
58  Plethon, Ep. 21, Mohler III, 466, 21–24. 
59  Ibid. 466, 24–467, 3. 
60  Plethon, On Fate, 68, my translation. 
61  Chrysippus appeals to divination (which depends on divine foreknowledge) in the following 
argument for determinism: oracles could not be true if not everything happened according to fate; but 
divination exists; consequently, everything happens according to fate (reported by Eusebius, 




with the Stoics in assuming that divine foreknowledge (and divination) stands or falls with the 
complete causal determination of events: if future events are predetermined, then it is possible 
to know them in advance, if they are not, then there cannot be foreknowledge. Alexander 
commits himself, however, to the existence of contingency, and  argues that foreknowledge is 
impossible in relation to contingent states of affairs. Future contingents cannot consequently 
be known by the gods either: what is impossible is impossible for the gods, as well. The same 
dilemma could have partially motivated the Middle Platonic view according to which fate is a 
law which comprises the infinity of the particular cases in a general form and that, in this way, 
renders them determinate and suitable objects of divine knowledge.62 
In his commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, Ammonius states the same 
dilemma which occupied Alexander (135, 1 ff. Busse). If the gods have a definite knowledge 
of future events and exercise providence over them, the contingent character of the events will 
be abolished; on the other hand, if future events are contingent, no divine providence and 
foreknowledge will be possible. Ammonius is in a position, however, to avail himself of a 
solution to this problem which was suggested by Iamblichus and which became standard in 
Neoplatonic circles.  
 
[…] we answer in accordance with the teaching of the divine Iamblichus and we shall 
think it right to distinguish the various degrees of knowledge by saying that knowledge 
is intermediate between the knower and the known, since it is the activity of the knower 
concerning the known […] and it sometimes knows the known in a way better than the 
nature of the knowable thing itself, sometimes worse, and sometimes on the same level.  
 
 […] they [sc. the gods] know the contingents in a manner better that the contingents’ 
own nature, which is why these things have an indefinite nature and can both occur and 
not occur, while the gods, who have preconceived the knowledge of the contingents in a 
manner better than their nature, know these things too in a definite manner.63  
 
The central idea is that the character of cognition depends, not so much on the nature of the 
object known, as on the nature of the knowing subject. In this way, divine knowledge can be 
extended to the contingent temporal world, without compromising the eternal and necessary 
way of being of the gods.64 Through this move, the Neoplatonists manage to preserve both 
their theological tenets, particularly, divine omniscience and providence on the one hand, and 
unchangeability and eternity on the other, and the genuine contingency of the sublunary world 
which is deeply rooted in the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. 
It is extremely unlikely that Plethon was unaware of the standard Neoplatonic way of 
reconciling divine foreknowledge and contingency. In my view, he ignores this possibility on 
purpose in the treatise On Fate. In any case, when Bessarion reminds him of this doctrine,65 
he is quick to dismiss it:  
                                                          
62  Pseudo–Plutarch, On Fate 570A. 
63  Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation, 135, 14–19; 136, 11–15, translation by D. Blank. 
64  Proclus concisely states the standard Neoplatonic solution: “The gods themselves know what is generated 
without generation, what is extended without extension, and what is divided without division, and what is in time 
eternally, and what is contingent necessarily.” In Tim. 1, 352, 5 ff. Diehl, translation by R. W. Sharples; cf. id., 
On Providence, 64. In the Latin tradition, this kind of solution was known in Boethius’ version, Consolatio V. 
prose 4–6. On the Iamblichean solution and Ammonius, see Tempelis 1997 and Sorabji’s studies in Ammonius 
1998; on Boethius’ version, Craig 1988, ch. 3. 
65  Bessarion, Ep. 18, Mohler III, 458, 9–13. Bessarion refers to Proclus’ Elements of Theology (see 






[…] those who attempt to refute the argument according to which God’s foreknowledge 
is abolished together with the abolition of fate, do not succeed in their refutation, when 
they say that God knows what is indeterminate in a determinate manner. For if 
‘indeterminate’ were some relation such as ‘double’, which is, being a relation, double 
in relation to one object but – although it remains one and the same thing – half in 
relation to another, those who speak in this way would perhaps seem to make some kind 
of sense. But since, if anything, ‘indeterminate’ is non-relative, what they say is rather  
as if they maintained that God knows a cow as a man or a man as a star. What kind of 
knowledge is it that consists in knowing something different about the object of 
knowledge from what it actually is?66  
 
Whatever the philosophical difficulties of the mainstream Neoplatonic solution, Plethon’s  
irreverence is striking, as the doctrine in question was initiated by the “divine Iamblichus”, 
and  was maintained by respected Platonists such as Proclus and Ammonius. The treatment of 
divine foreknowledge reveals, once again, that Plethon uses his possible sources selectively 
(not to say tendentiously). He extracts from Platonic authors, and possibly from Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, the Stoic doctrines and arguments that are being criticized, and he himself adopts 
the Stoic position. The argument from divine foreknowledge is particularly interesting 
because in this case Plethon ignores later developments within the Platonic tradition, and  
consciously returns to an earlier phase of the debate in which divine foreknowledge of 
particular events and their genuine contingency were considered as incompatible 
alternatives.67 
 
6. Freedom and the external determination of human reason 
 
The question of moral responsibility, to which the final part of the treatise On Fate is 
devoted,68 is a notorious difficulty which all determinists have to face. The objection Plethon 
attempts to answer goes as follows. If everything is predetermined and happens through 
necessity, human beings will not be either masters of themselves (κύριοι ἑαυτῶν) or free 
(ἐλεύθεροι), and, given that bad people are necessarily bad, divine punishment cannot be 
just.70 
In reply to this objection, Plethon interprets freedom (ἐλευθερία) in terms of “living as 
one wants to”, and  insists that “well-being”, the state which everyone wants to achieve, does 
not require the agent to be exempt from causal determination and from necessity. Freedom 
should be contrasted with slavery rather than with necessity. 
 
                                                          
66  Plethon, Ep. 19, 463, 4–12, my translation. 
67  Another way to reconcile divine foreknowledge with contingency and human autonomy was 
propounded by Origen who argues that foreknowledge does not cause the events foreknown and does 
not render them necessary (Against Celsus II.20; Philocalia 23 and 25). On Origen’s solution, see 
Craig 1988, 80. Bugár (2006) suggests that Origen’s strategy of severing the logical and the causal 
orders goes back to a remark by Carneades (Cicero, De Fato 14.32). Plethon seems to reject Origen’s 
approach as he connects divine foreknowledge with causation. In his view, the gods know the future 
events by being their cause, by arranging and determining them (On Fate, 68–70 Alexandre), rather 
than by being affected by them. The notion of causal knowledge has Stoic roots, cf. Wallis 1981, 225. 
Causal knowledge is recognized by Ammonius (On Aristotle On Interpretation 132, 13 ff.), but he 
qualifies divine agency in such a way as to leave room for human autonomy. 
68  Plethon, On Fate, 70–78. 




If, then, someone defines freedom in this rather than in that way, namely, in terms of 
being hindered or not to live as one wishes to (τῷ κωλύεσθαι ἢ μὴ κωλύεσθαί τινα ζῇν 
ὡς βούλεται) – everyone wishes to fare well and to be happy – , then everybody who 
fares well will be free, no matter whether or not he is subject to rule.71   
 
This interpretation of freedom resembles the traditional Stoic understanding of this notion 
which becomes central in Epictetus.72 Let me quote a characteristic statement of this view:  
 
He is free who lives as he wills (ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται), who is subject 
neither to compulsion (ἀναγκάσαι), nor hindrance (κωλῦσαι), not force, whose choices 
are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do not fall into what 
they would avoid.73  
 
In Epictetus’ view, one can avoid frustration and fulfill her desires only if she manages to 
confine them to what is under her exclusive control (that is, to certain aspects of her mental 
life), and thus refrains from pursuing external things which might enslave her. This notion of 
freedom ultimately goes back to Socrates who argued, according to Xenophon, that freedom 
can be achieved by self-control (ἐγκράτεια), the rule of reason over irrational desires, which is 
the only way to make sure that one is not  “hindered (κωλύεσθαι) in doing what is most 
honorable” or “forced (ἀναγκάζεσθαι) to do what is most dishonorable”.74 We might admit 
that this kind of freedom is compatible with determinism. There is a problem, however. The 
internal freedom is a normative ideal which cannot serve as the basis for moral 
responsibility.75 This is obvious, since moral responsibility must extend to every rational 
agent, while freedom is the privilege of a select few. Furthermore, Plethon seems to disregard 
an important aspect of the Stoic doctrine, namely, the emphasis on the contrast between 
internal and external. Plethon maintains that external determination and freedom are 
compatible, whereas Epictetus interprets freedom, in line with the Stoic tradition,  in terms of 
autonomy as opposed to heteronomy.76 
The latter difficulty can be brought out more clearly by examining Plethon’ treatment 
of self-mastery. Plethon suggests that human beings are masters of themselves (κύριοι 
ἑαυτῶν) to the extent to which reason is capable of controlling  irrational desires.77 In his 
view, the fact that different people may react differently to the same situation reveals the 
individual differences of their minds which can be explained in terms of nature and training 
(φύσις, ἄσκησις). Plethon's view is that the individual nature of reason is bestowed on us by 
the gods. Training, by which we shape ourselves, depends on our opinion (δόξα). The latter is, 
                                                          
71  Plethon, On Fate, 74–76, translation by Woodhouse. 
72  Epictetus, Diss. IV.1.1; cf. IV.1.128; II.1.23–2. Cf. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 34; De officiis I. 
69 ff.; Persius: V. Sat.; Philo, Quod omnis probus 59 f., cf. 97; Dio Chrysostomus, Or. 14.17. 
73  Epictetus, Diss. IV.1.1, Oldfather’s translation. 
74  Xenophon, Memorabilia IV.5.3–5 and 7. The phrases above are taken from IV.5.4, translation by E. 
C. Marchant, modified. It should be noted that in the Stoics’ monistic psychological theory irrational 
desires involve mistaken judgements formed by reason itself, while Xenophon seems to contrast 
reason and desire in a less sophisticated manner. 
75  Bobzien 1998, 330 ff. argues that normative freedom (ἐλευθερία) and the autonomy requisite for 
moral responsibility (‘that which depends on us’, τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) are distinct notions that serve to 
articulate different philosophical problems.  
76  Bobzien 1998, ch 7. 




however, likewise implanted into us by the gods.78 In short, Plethon argues for the external 
determination of reason rather than for its autonomy. ‘Being master’ traditionally refers to the 
fact that an activity originates from the agent herself and is completely under her control, as 
opposed to succumbing to external influences.79 In contrast, Plethon limits ‘self-mastery’ to 
the intrapsychic relationship between reason and irrational desire.80 This analysis is less than 
satisfactory in the present connection, as it fails to address the question of the threat posed by 
external determination to moral responsibility.81 
 The fact that Plethon allows for, or rather insists on, the external determination of the 
mind is all the more surprising as the major ancient philosophical schools vindicate human 
autonomy in some form. The Stoics solve the problem of moral responsibility by claiming 
that the external circumstances and the representations conveying them to the mind are merely 
auxiliary causes of assent, the act that launches the psychic process leading to action, which 
means that its main cause must be internal to the agent.82 It is vital to Stoic compatibilism that 
human action is autonomous, that is, not necessitated or induced by external factors. The 
Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias, while he propounds a novel libertarian notion of ‘that 
which depends on us’, is presupposing all along, in the footsteps of Aristotle, that the 
principle of action is internal to human agents.83 
As for the Platonists, we saw above that they emphasize the independence of the 
human soul from external (particularly to physical) influences. Plato himself suggested that 
the soul, due to its self-moving nature, is the ultimate origin of motion both on a cosmic scale 
and in the individual organisms, and  used this doctrine to establish moral responsibility. In a 
letter to Plethon, Bessarion takes up this thread, and, invoking Simplicius’ authority,  urges 
that choice and volition (προαίρεσις) must be regarded as being in one’s own power 
(αὐτεξούσιος) and in no way necessitated, otherwise the self-moving quality (τὸ αὐτοκίνητον) 
of the soul and thereby its essence is abolished.84 Bessarion’s objection to Plethon’s 
determinism is embedded in his more general critique of Plethon’s theory of causality. 
Bessarion draws attention to the (Neo)platonic doctrine of self-constitution. According to this 
theory, the dependence of intelligible entities on higher causes is not to be understood in terms 
                                                          
78  Plethon, On Fate, 72. 
79  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1113b32, id., Eudemian Ethics 1223a5;  [Aristotle], Magna Moralia 
1207a19–25; Epictetus, Diss. I.11.37; IV.12.7; Plotinus Ennead VI.8.13, 10; 15, 9; Porphyry, Quaest. 
Hom. ad Odysseiam, I.5.46; Simplicius, Commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion 64, 16; 67, 29. 
80   “Men are masters of themselves not in the sense that they are ruled by absolutely no one, neither by other 
beings nor by the gods themselves, but in the sense that they have within themselves their sole ruling principle, 
namely their intelligence (τὸ φρονοῦν), and their other elements are ruled by it.” Plethon, On Fate 72, translation 
by Woodhouse. 
81  Plethon dispenses with the problem of divine justice by arguing that punishment coming from the 
gods is divine assistance aimed at correction rather than retaliation (On fate, 76–78). This is based on 
Plato’s penology  set out in the Gorgias and in the Laws, but it is hardly adequate as a solution to the 
difficulty at stake, as it evades the problem of personal responsibility. If divine punishment benefits the 
wrongdoer, the question as to whether he deserves it becomes less pressing. 
82  Chrysippus’ argument for compatibilism invoking the distinction of causes is better preserved in 
the Latin sources than it is in the Greek ones (Cicero, De Fato 40.2–43, Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 
7.2). See, however, Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1055f–1056a and 1057a–b, with Bobzien 
1998, 271–274. 
83  Alexander, On Fate ch. 15, 185, 12–22, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1110b15–17; 1111a22–
24; 1113b17–21. 
84  Bessarion, Ep. 18, Mohler III.457, 23–30. Bessarion’s short remark recapitulates a long argument 
in Simplicius’ Commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion (8, 37–14, 24 Dübner, see particularly 13, 49–





of deterministic one-way causation since souls and intellects qualify as self-constituting 
entities (αὐθυπόστατα), that is, they cooperate with their principles in bringing about their 
own nature.85 Self-constitution tells against Plethon’s doctrine of fate (in particular, against the 
thesis of the external determination of the soul), even if Bessarion does not state this in so 
many words.86 Plethon replies to this objection that self-motion and self-constitution must be 
comprehended in a restricted sense.87 He argues that so-called self-movers can be analyzed 
into a part which moves and another part which is moved. In the case of the soul, which as a 
whole qualifies as a self-mover, the impulse, the will, and the emotions “are moved by our 
thinking part (τὸ φρονοῦν) and they are ruled by it, whereas it [the thinking part] itself is 
moved from the outside.”88 The thinking part owes its motion to the external circumstances or 
to God. Plethon borrows the strategy, invoking a distinction within the alleged self-movers, 
from Aristotle’s anti-Platonic analysis of the origin of motion,89 and additionally applies the 
same strategy to self-constitution. In his view, self-constitution likewise involves a part which 
brings about the other parts, and the former depends on God for its being. He interprets 
external causation in relation to allegedly self-moving and self-constitutive entities in 
deterministic terms, that is, he assumes that the external cause necessitates its effects.90 
We can conclude that the thesis according to which the soul is externally determined 
is Plethon’s considered view. In this point, he goes against the consensus of mainstream 
ancient philosophical traditions, including Plato and his followers. 
 
7. The legacy of ancient philosophy and the construction of a new pagan Platonism 
 
One might wonder what Plethon’s motives were for departing from the Platonic tradition 
concerning causation and human autonomy, and adopting instead an extreme determinist, or 
rather neccessitarian, position which leaves little room for autonomous human action. It is, of 
course, completely natural to assume that a philosopher coming up with a provocative theory 
is simply elaborating an intuition the truth of which he is firmly convinced of. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that Plethon’s theory of fate is motivated, at least partly, by a theology of 
history which makes the political success of a community dependent on their faith in divine 
predestination. Islamic fatalism could have served as a model for such a theory.91 In addition 
                                                          
85  Bessarion, Ep. 18, Mohler III, 455, 6–456, 22. Bessarion sees a parallel between self-constitution 
and self-motion, both of which can be used to demonstrate the immortality and indestructibility of 
intelligible substances. 
86  Note that Bessarion introduces the theory of self-constitution as a qualification of the principle of 
causality (Ep. 18, Mohler III, 455, 6–10), on which Plethon’s theory of fate rests.  
87  Plethon discusses self-motion at length in his reply to Bessarion’s first quaestio concerning self-
constitution (Ep. 19, Mohler III, 459, 13–460, 5, esp. 459, 23 ff.). In his reply to Bessarion’s fourth 
quaestio concerning fate (ibid., 461, 81–463, 19), he restates his argument against self-motion (see 
esp. ibid., 461, 35–462, 3).  
88  Plethon, Ep. 19, Mohler III,  462, 10–11, reading ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ κινούμενον instead of Mohler’s ἔξωθεν 
αὐτοκινούμενον.  
89  Aristotle, Physics VII.1;  VIII.4–6; De motu animalium 1–4. 
90  The object of volition (βουλητόν) and beliefs (δόγματα), which are implanted into the soul from 
the outside, are said to cause human action in a necessary manner (σὺν ἀνάγκῃ), Ep. 19, Mohler III, 
461, 32–35 and 462, 30f. This is entailed by Plethon’s second causal principle (‘the cause produces its 
effects in a necessary and determinate fashion’, see section 4 above), unless causal responsibility is 
distributed among more than one cause, possibly belonging to various types. Plethon does not seem, 
however, to be interested in making such qualifications. 




to these factors, another motive seems particularly relevant, namely, Plethon’s anti-
Christianism. 
Human autonomy was a central concern in Christian thought from the time of the 
apologetes onwards. Divine omnipotence, goodness and justice can only be preserved by 
demonstrating that the responsibility for evil lies with man and other rational creatures rather 
than with their Creator. Christian writers engaging in polemics against Gnostic and 
astrological determinism borrowed their arguments from pagan Platonic and Aristotelian 
philosophers who attacked the Stoic theory of fate. In spite of their heated debates in other 
areas, pagan Platonists and Christians of late antiquity found themselves on the same side in 
the dispute on fate and human autonomy. In fact, Origen’s account of human freedom, which 
has become very influential in subsequent Christian thought, is based on Stoic and Platonic 
conceptions of autonomy.92 John of Damascus, who sums up the patristic tradition in the 7-8th  
centuries, takes over the late Neoplatonic strategy to reconcile divine foreknowledge and 
human freedom.93 
 The view of the causal structure of the world and of human action which emerges 
from Plethon’s theory of fate is the negative of the image of the world and man which had 
come to be generally accepted among orthodox Christians in Patristic times. Plethon interprets 
fate in terms of an all-embracing necessitating power, he plays out divine foreknowledge 
against contingency and human freedom, and  champions the external determination of the 
soul instead of autonomy. In all these issues, he is opposing crucial Christian tenets. It is 
plausible to suppose that Plethon abandoned mainstream Platonism concerning fate and 
human autonomy because of its agreement with the standard Christian view. When he decided 
to break with Christian doctrine and to work out a theological and philosophical alternative, 
he turned to the Stoics for inspiration, and advanced a causal theory resembling the Stoics’ 
doctrine of fate as portrayed by their Platonic and Peripatetic opponents. It is not the case, 
however, that Plethon somehow came under the Stoics’ spell and simply adopted their 
doctrine of fate and autonomy. When it comes to the all-important issue of human autonomy, 
he also parts company with the Stoics. It might be suspected that his motive for doing so is, 
once again, the desire to set up a position radically opposed to Christianity. In short, the main 
doctrinal features of Plethon’s theory of fate and human freedom can be understood in terms 
of an anti-Christian agenda.94 
 A doctrinal comparison reveals that Plethon breaks with mainstream Platonism in the 
central issues of fate and human autonomy. Can we continue calling him a Platonist? I believe 
that this question should be answered in the affirmative, notwithstanding Plethon’s departure 
from the Platonic tradition concerning the problems I have scrutinized in this paper. Plethon’s 
thought is in many ways indebted to Plato and the ancient Platonists both in doctrine and in 
the form of speculation. His philosophy is permeated by Platonic elements such as the 
distinction between the sensible and  intelligible reality, hierarchical ontology, the integration 
                                                          
92  Origen, On principles III.1. For an analysis, see Frede 2011, 102–124. Frede’s main thesis is that 
the notion of a free will emerged in imperial Stoicism, and it was taken over by Platonism and 
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Bugár 2009. 
93  Demetracopoulos 2012 has shown in detail that John’s account of divine knowledge goes back to 
Ammonius’ and Stephanus’ commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. 
94  For an argument for Plethon’s paganism, with an overview of the scholarly debate on whether 
Plethon’s paganism should be taken at face value, see Siniossoglou 2011, 148–160. Hladký 2014 
argues for the possibility that Plethon’s Laws is a literary experiment rather than a pagan confession. – 




of pagan mythology into the metaphysical scheme, political utopianism and the conception of 
the tradition of ancient wisdom, to name but a few examples. Moreover, as I have mentioned 
above, he actually sides with Plato against Aristotle in De differentiis. Finally, when Bessarion 
invokes Plato and ancient Platonists in his objections, Plethon makes an attempt to create a 
Platonic pedigree for his doctrines.95 
 Plethon’s thought cannot be regarded, however, as a direct continuation of ancient 
Neoplatonism.96 In this respect, his reaction to Bessarion’s criticisms is particularly 
instructive. While Bessarion appeals to the ‘confraternity’ (θίασος) of Platonists,97 Plethon 
prefaces his reply with a diaphonia argument in relation to the Platonic tradition.98 By 
emphasizing the disagreements among Platonists, he immunizes himself against the charge of 
deviation from Platonic orthodoxy. Furthermore, Plethon dismisses Plato’s myth of Er, 
adduced by Bessarion against determinism, as a narrative that cannot be taken as an exact 
statement (δι' ἀκριβείας λεγόμενα).99 This contravenes the exegetical norms of ancient 
Neoplatonists who, from Iamblichus onward, attempted to account for every detail of Plato’s 
dialogues in their own terms. We should also recall that Plethon does not shrink from the 
drastic step of rewriting Plato’s text when he has doctrinal qualms with it.100 Through these 
methods, he manages to free himself from the doctrinal constraints, which Plato’s texts or 
their traditional Platonic interpretations might place on him, while still claiming the authority 
of that tradition. It has been observed that Plethon alternates between the plural first and the 
third persons when talking about the Platonists, and at one point  even explicitly distances 
himself from Plato’s view.101 I take it that these formulations are not to be explained merely in 
terms of tactical considerations on Plethon’s part. They instead reflect the fact that Plethon 
maintains a greater distance from Plato and the Platonic traditions than the ancient Platonists 
usually do. The case of his theory of fate reveals that he is capable of almost completely 
detaching himself from traditional Platonic commitments. 
 Plethon treats the ancient philosophical tradition as a whole in a similar spirit. In the 
preface to his great work, the Laws, he promises “a theology according to Zoroaster and 
Plato”, “an ethics according to the same sages, and also according to the Stoics” and “a 
physics according to Aristotle, for the most part”.102 Plethon acknowledges his reliance on a 
complex philosophical heritage, but accords pride of place to the Pythagorean-Platonic 
tradition from Pythagoras to Iamblichus. He emphasizes, quite in the vein of  fundamentalist 
Platonic ideology,103 that the ancient sages and eminent philosophers (mostly Platonists) are in 
                                                          
95  For Plethon’s exegetical arguments for the Platonic character of his doctrine of fate, see his Ep. 19, 
Mohler III, 462, 21–39 and Ep. 21, ibid., 466, 8–31. 
96  I differ here from both Karamanolis 2002 and Siniossoglou 2011 (for their respective approaches, 
see section 1 above). Unlike Karamanolis, I believe that Plethon’s claims to be an orthodox Platonist 
cannot be taken at face value. Similarly, Siniossoglou’s suggestion of the survival of ancient Platonism 
through Byzantine times does not help to explain Plethon’s doctrine of fate and autonomy, as he 
manifestly breaks with the standard ancient Platonic (and, at some points, even with the Stoic) 
doctrines. It is not easy to find direct precursors to his deterministic understanding of fate in Byzantine 
thought (cf. Beck 1937, 198–206). Psellus, a prominent Byzantine Platonist, restricts fate to the 
physical world and  insists on contingency and human autonomy (Beck 1937, 90–92; 
Demetracopoulos 200, 307 f. with note 18). 
97  Bessarion, Ep. 18, Mohler III, 455, 11. 
98  Plethon, Ep. 19, Mohler III, 458, 21–459–12. 
99  Plethon, Ep. 19, Mohler III, 462,33–34. 
100  Pagani 2009. 
101  Woodhouse 1986, 216, referring to De differentiis chs. 12, 23, 37 and 42 (his numbering). 
102  Plethon, Laws, 2–4. 




agreement on the most important issues.104 There is, however, another important facet to his 
self-presentation. In the Laws, he sets out from a diaphonia argument (I.1), and, having listed 
“the best guides to truth”,  indicates that he reserves for himself the right of adjudicating the 
debated issues in accordance with the views of those ancient authorities “who thought most 
correctly on each occasion”, using “reason, the most efficient and most divine of our 
discriminatory faculties”.105 In this way, he creates a space for free thought, while claiming to 
be the heir of ancient wisdom. 
 As Plethon’s theory of fate indicates, his actual philosophical practice squares well 
with these programmatic statements. The doctrinal features of this theory cannot be explained 
in terms of Platonic or Stoic influences – a causal model of explanation does not seem to be 
adequate here. Ficino, who relies basically on the same ancient texts, constructs a Christian 
Platonism. I have suggested that Plethon’s theory of fate reflects an anti-Christian agenda. It is 
not the case, however, that he simply revives the pagan Platonism of late antiquity. This can 
be seen from the fact that ancient Neoplatonists and Christians do not clash over the issue of 
fate and human autonomy, whereas Plethon radically rejects their shared views. An 
examination of Plethon’s theory of fate leads to the conclusion that he reconstitutes pagan 
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